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Abstract
Turing progressions have been often used to measure the proof-theoretic
strength of mathematical theories: iterate adding consistency of some
weak base theory until you “hit” the target theory. Turing progressions
based on n-provability give rise to a Πn+1 proof-theoretic ordinal |U |Π0
n+1
.
As such, to each theory U we can assign the sequence of corresponding
Πn+1 ordinals 〈|U |n〉n>0. We call this sequence a Turing-Taylor expansion
or spectrum of a theory.
In this paper, we relate Turing-Taylor expansions of sub-theories of
Peano Arithmetic to Ignatiev’s universal model for the closed fragment
of the polymodal provability logic GLPω. In particular, we observe that
each point in the Ignatiev model can be seen as Turing-Taylor expansions
of formal mathematical theories.
Moreover, each sub-theory of Peano Arithmetic that allows for a Turing-
Taylor expansion will define a unique point in Ignatiev’s model.
1 Introduction
Alan Turing considered in his dissertation progressions that are based on trans-
finitely adding consistency statements ([18]). If we disregard for the moment
subtle coding and representation issues, these Turing progressions starting with
some base theory T were defined by
T 0 := T ;
Tα+1 := Tα ∪ { Con(Tα) };
Tλ :=
⋃
α<λ T
α for limit λ.
Here, Con(Tα) denotes some natural formalization of the statement that the
theory Tα cannot derive, say, 0 = 1. If one starts out with a sound base theory
T this gives rise to a progression of increasing proof-theoretic strength. Since
the consistency statements are of logical complexity Π01, Turing progressions can
be used to define a Π01 ordinal of a theory that contains (interprets) arithmetic;
one starts out with a relatively weak theory T and defines the Π01 ordinal of
some target theory U by
|U |Π01 := sup{α | T
α ⊆ U}.
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Using stronger notions of provability this can be generalized. We shall use [n]T
to denote a formalization of “provable in T together with all true Π0n sentences”
and 〈n〉T will denote the dual consistency notion ¬[n]¬. Generalized Turing
progressions are readily defined:
T 0n := T ;
Tα+1n := T
α
n ∪ {〈n〉Tαn⊤};
T λn :=
⋃
α<λ T
α
n for limit λ.
Here, the ⊤ stands for some fixed provable like for example 1 = 1 so that 〈n〉Tαn⊤
simply says that the theory Tαn is consistent with all true Πn formulas. We can
now define the Π0n+1 proof-theoretical ordinal of a theory U w.r.t. some base
theory T :
|U |Π0n := sup{α | T
α
n ⊆ U}.
Using Primitive Recursive Arithmetic as base theory, U. Schmerl proved in [17]
that |PA|Π0n = ε0 for all n ∈ ω and Beklemishev showed ([2, 3, 4]) how provability
logics can naturally be employed to perform and simplify the computations to
obtain these ordinals.
In this paper we shall see how various theories can be written as the finite
union of Turing progressions in a way reminiscent of how C∞ functions can
be written as a countable sum of monomials in their Taylor expansion. Hence,
we shall speak of Turing-Taylor expansions of arithmetical theories. Whereas
the monomials in a Turing expansion of a C∞ function are in a sense orthog-
onal, the monomials in our Turing-Taylor expansions are not. Therefore, we
will sometimes call the Turing-Taylor expansions also ordinal spectra or simply
spectra of theories.
2 Arithmetical preliminaries
We need to formalize various arguments that use cut-elimination. To this end,
we assume that the base theory proves supexp, i.e. the totality of the super-
exponential function x 7→ 2xx, where 2
x
0 := x and 2
x
y+1 := 2
2xy . However, we also
need that our base theories are of low logical complexity aka, that the axioms
are of logical complexity at most Π01.
To this end, we shall assume that any theory T will be in a language that
contains a function symbol for the super-exponentiation and that the recursive
defining equations for this super-exponentiation are amongst the axioms of T .
After having fixed our language, we define the arithmetical hierarchy syn-
tactically as usual: ∆0 formulas are those formulas that only employ bounded
quantification (i.e., quantification of the form ∀x<t where t is some term not
containing x); If φ ∈ Πn (Σn resp.), then ∃ ~x φ ∈ Σn+1 (∀~xφ ∈ Πn+1 resp.).
Since T has a constant for super-exponentiation, T will be able to prove the
totality of super-exponentiation in a trivial way using induction for ∆0 formulas.
It is folklore that ∆0 induction can be axiomatized in a Π1 fashion:
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Lemma 2.1. Over Robinson’s arithmetic Q the following two schemes are equiv-
alent
1. ∀x (∀ y<xφ(y)→ φ(x))→ ∀x φ(x) for φ ∈ ∆0;
2. ∀x
(
∀ z≤x
[
∀ y<z φ(y)→ φ(z)
]
→ φ(x)
)
for φ ∈ ∆0.
Proof. The only non-trivial direction is (1)⇒ (2) which follows by applying (1)
to φ′(x, u) := x ≤ u→ φ(x).
In the paper we shall heavily use formalized provability and the correspond-
ing provability logics. As such, for c.e. theories T we fix natural formalizations
[n]T of “provable in T together with all true Πn sentences” of complexity Σn+1
and the dual consistency notion 〈n〉T of complexity Πn+1. When the context
allows us to, we shall drop mention of the base theory T and moreover, instead
of writing [0] (〈0〉) we often write  (♦).
We shall typically refrain from distinguishing a formula φ from its Go¨del
number or even a natural syntactical term denoting its Go¨del number. Also, we
use the standard dot notation φ(x˙) to denote a formula with free variable x
so that for each x the formula φ(x˙) is provably equivalent to n where n is
the Go¨del number of φ(t) where t is some term (often called numeral) denoting
x. Note that for non-standard x, the corresponding term denoting x will also
be non-standard.
We shall assume that each c.e. theory T that we consider comes with a ∆0
formula that defines the set of Go¨del numbers of axioms of T on the standard
model. A main result about formalized provability is formulated in what is
nowadays called Lo¨b’s rule ([16]):
Proposition 2.2. Let T be a theory extending EA. If T ⊢ φ→ φ, then T ⊢ φ.
The natural way to prove statements about Turing progression is by trans-
finite induction. Weaker theories however cannot prove transfinite induction.
Schmerl ([17]) introduced a way to circumvent transfinite induction employing
so-called reflexive transfinite induction.
Lemma 2.3 (Reflexive transfinite induction). Let T be some theory extending
say, EA, so that
T ⊢ ∀α
(
T ∀β<α˙ φ(β) → φ(α)
)
.
Then it holds that T ⊢ ∀α φ(α).
Proof. Clearly, if T ⊢ ∀α
(
T ∀β<α˙ φ(β) → φ(α)
)
, then also
T ⊢ T ∀α φ(α) → ∀α φ(α),
and the result follows from Lo¨b’s rule.
For theories U and V , we shall write U ≡n V for the statement that U and
V prove the same Πn+1 formulas.
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3 Modal preliminaries
We shall see that the polymodal provability logic GLPω is particularly well-suited
to speak about Turing progressions and finite unions thereof.
3.1 Provability logics and worms
We first define a polymodal version of provability logic as introduced by Japaridze
in [12].
Definition 3.1. The propositional polymodal provability logic GLPω has for each
n < ω a modality [n] with dual modality 〈n〉 being short for ¬[n]¬. The language
contains the constants ⊤ and ⊥ for logical truth and falsity respectively.
The rules of GLPω are Modus Ponens and Necessitation for each [n] modality:
φ
[n]φ . The axioms are
1. All propositional tautologies in the language of GLPω;
2. [n](φ→ ψ)→ ([n]φ→ [n]ψ) for each n < ω and GLPω formulas φ and ψ;
3. [n]([n]φ→ φ)→ [n]φ for each n < ω and GLPω formula φ;
4. [n]φ→ [m]φ for each n < m < ω and each GLPω formula φ;
5. 〈n〉φ→ [m]〈n〉φ for each n < m < ω and each GLPω formula φ;
It is well-known that [n]φ→ [n][n]φ is derivable in GLPω and we shall use that
without specific mention. The logic GLPω is sound and complete for a wide
range of theories T when interpreting the modal operator [n] as the formalized
provability predicate [n]T ([12, 11]).
A standing assumption throughout all this paper is that all theories that we
consider yield soundness of GLPω . Moreover, we shall assume that any theory T
contains EA+ and has a set of axioms whose set of Go¨del numbers is definable
on the standard model by a ∆0 formula.
The closed fragment GLP0ω of GLPω consists of all those GLPω theorems that
do not contain propositional variables. We define worms to be the collection of
iterated consistency statements within GLP0ω and denote them by W:
Definition 3.2. For each n < ω, the empty worm ⊤ is in Wn; We inductively
define that if A ∈ Wn and ω > m ≥ n, then 〈m〉A ∈ Wn. The set W of all
GLPω worms is just W0.
Often we shall just identify a worm with the string of subsequent modality
indices denoting the empty string by ⊤ for convenience. We now define a con-
venient decomposition of worms that will allow for inductive proofs.
Definition 3.3. For a GLPω worm A, its n-head –we write hn(A)–is the left-
most part of A that consists of only modalities which are at least n. The re-
maining part of A is called the n-remainder and is denoted by rn(A).
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More formally: hn(⊤) = ⊤; and hn(mA) = mhn(A) in case m ≥ n and ⊤
otherwise. Likewise: rn(⊤) = ⊤ and rn(mA) = rn(A) in case m ≥ n and mA
otherwise.
The following lemma whose proof we leave as an exercise turns out to be very
useful.
Lemma 3.4. For each GLPω-worm A and for each n < ω, we have
GLPω ⊢ A↔ hn(A) ∧ rn(A).
3.2 Lost in translation
It is well-known ([4, 5]) that worms constitute an alternative ordinal notation
systems if we order them by
A <n B :⇔ GLPω ⊢ B → 〈n〉A.
Proposition 3.5. 〈ε0, <〉 ∼= 〈Wn/ ≡, <n〉.
Here, Wn/ ≡ denotes Wn modulo GLPω provable equivalence and 〈ε0, <〉 is
just the ordinal ε0 = sup{ω, ω
ω, ωω
ω
, . . .} under the usual ordinal ordering <.
Worms can be related smoothly to more standard ordinal notations using
the so-called hyper-exponentiation functions en : On → On (see [7]) where On
denotes the class of ordinals and e0 is the identity function; e1 : ξ 7→ −1 + ωξ;
and en+m = en ◦ em. The following theorem is proven in [9]:
Proposition 3.6. Let o0 :W→ On be defined by
1. o0(⊤) = 0;
2. o0(B0A) = o0(A) + 1 + o0(B);
3. o0(n ↑ A) = e
n(o0(A)).
Here, n ↑ A denotes the worm that arises by simultaneously substituting any
modality m in A by n+m.
Further, for any worm A ∈ W we define on(n ↑ A) := o0(A) and on(A) :=
on(hn(A)). We now have that
on : 〈Wn/ ≡, <n〉 ∼= 〈ε0, <〉.
In previous papers on polymodal provability logics, various proofs are rather
involved since they work with classical ordinal notation systems. Worms have
further logical and algebraic structure so that in the context of provability logics
and Turing progressions, they are the better ordinal notation systems.
Notation 3.7. For A∈W, by TAn we shall denote the Turing progression T
on(A)
n .
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Note that in virtue of our definitions we have that TAn = T
hn(A)
n and we shall
use both notations interchangeably. Moreover, we note that a worm can denote
various objects: an iterated consistency statement in modal logic, an iterated
consistency statement in the language of arithmetic, and an ordinal. The context
will always reveal what kind of object the occurrence of a particular worm
denotes and thus we refrain from separating the different possible denotations
by introducing extra notation.
4 Turing Taylor expansions
We shall see that various theories can be written as the finite union of simple
Turing progressions which we call the Turing-Taylor expansion. We start by
looking at theories axiomatized by worms. Recall that all our theories are in
the language containing a symbol for super-exponentiation and are supposed to
come with a ∆0 axiomatization.
4.1 Worms and Turing progressions
The generalized Turing progressions T nA are not too sensitive to adding “small”
elements to the base theory as is expressed by the following lemma.
Lemma 4.1. For any theory T and for any σ ∈ Σn+1, we have provably in
EA+ that
(T + σ)αn ≡ (T )
α
n + σ for any α < ǫ0.
In particular, for any theory T and for any GLPω worm A, if m < n < ω, then
(T +mA)αn ≡ (T )
α
n +mA for any α < ǫ0.
Proof. By a straight-forward reflexive transfinite induction using provable Σn+1-
completeness at the inductive step: for n < ω and σ ∈ Σn+1, we have
σ → [n]T σ.
The main motor to relate provability logics to Turing progression is by means
of the following theorem.
Theorem 4.2. Let T be some elementary presented theory containing EA+
whose axioms have logical complexity at most Πn+1 and let A be some worm in
Wn. We have, provably in EA
+, that
T +A ≡n T
A
n .
Proof. By reflexive transfinite induction. We refer to [4, Theorem 17] for details.
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In general we do of course not have1 that if U ≡n V , then U+ψ ≡n V +ψ for
theories U and V and formulas ψ. However, in the case of Turing progressions
we can include “small” additions on both sides and preserve conservativity.
Lemma 4.3. Let T some theory whose axioms have logical complexity at most
Πn+1 and let A be some worm in Wn. Moreover, let B be any worm and m < n.
We have, verifiably in T , that
T +A+mB ≡n T
A
n +mB.
Proof. As m < n we have that mB ∈ Πn. Whence, we can apply Theorem 4.2
to the theory T +mB and obtain
T +mB +A ≡n (T +mB)
A
n
However, by Lemma 4.1 we see that
(T +mB)An ≡ T
A
n +mB, whence T +mB +A ≡n T
A
n +mB.
From this lemma we obtain the following simple but very useful corollary.
Corollary 4.4. Let T be some theory whose axioms have logical complexity at
most Πn+1. Moreover, let A be any worm. We have verifiably in T that
T +A ≡n T
hn(A)
n + rn(A) ≡n T
A
n + rn(A).
Proof. Since GLP ⊢ A↔ hn(A)∧rn(A) and since by assumption GLPω is sound
w.r.t. T we see that T + A ≡ T + hn(A) + rn(A). The worm rn(A) is either
empty or of the form mA for some m < n. Clearly, hn(A) ∈Wn. Thus, we can
apply Lemma 4.3 and obtain
T + hn(A) + rn(A) ≡n T
hn(A)
n + rn(A).
Recall that by our notation convention (Notation 3.7) and by the definition of
on (see Proposition 3.6), we have that T
hn(A)
n + rn(A) ≡ T
A
n + rn(A).
4.2 Theories axiomatized by worms
From Theorem 4.2 we see that we can capture the Π01 consequences of the o(A)-
th Turing Progression of T by the simply axiomatized theory T +A.
That is, T + A proves the same Π01 formulas as T
0
A. However, T + A will
in general prove many new formulas of higher complexity. We can characterize
those consequences of T + A also in terms of Turing progressions as we see in
the next theorem.
1It is known that PRA + ¬IΣ1 and IΣ1 are Π02 equivalent (see [14, Lemma 3.4]). Clearly,
PRA+ ¬IΣ1 + IΣ1 6≡1 IΣ1.
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Theorem 4.5. Let T be some Π01 axiomatizable theory. Let A be any GLPω
worm. We have, verifiably in T , that
1. T +A ≡
⋃
i<ω T
A
i , and
2. T +A ≡n
⋃n
i=0 T
A
i .
Proof. It suffices to prove the second item in the form of T +A ≡n
⋃n
i=0 T
hi(A)
i
since for any worm A, we have hi(A) = ⊤ for i large enough. We prove the
second item by an external induction on n and the base case follows directly
from Theorem 4.2.
For the inductive case we reason in T as follows. By Corollary 4.4 we know
that
T +A ≡n+1 T
hn+1(A)
n+1 + rn+1(A). (1)
In particular, as T
hn+1(A)
n+1 + rn+1(A) ⊆ Πn+2 we see that actually, T + A is a
Πn+2-conservative extension of T
hn+1(A)
n+1 + rn+1(A), that is,
T +A ⊢ T
hn+1(A)
n+1 + rn+1(A).
The induction hypothesis tells us that
T +A ≡n
n⋃
i=0
T
hi(A)
i . (2)
Again, since
⋃n
i=0 T
hi(A)
i ⊆ Πn+1 we obtain that
T +A ⊢
n⋃
i=0
T
hi(A)
i .
Thus, T +A ⊢
⋃n+1
i=0 T
hi(A)
i and in particular, if
⋃n+1
i=0 T
hi(A)
i ⊢ π then T +A ⊢ π
for π ∈ Πn+2.
Conversely, assume that T +A ⊢ π for some Πn+2 sentence π. By (1) we see
that T
hn+1(A)
n+1 + rn+1(A) ⊢ π. However, rn+1(A) ∈ Πn+1 and T +A ⊢ rn+1(A)
so, by (2) we see that
⋃n
i=0 T
hi(A)
i ⊢ rn+1(A). Thus
⋃n+1
i=0 T
hi(A)
i ⊢ T
hn+1(A)
n+1 + rn+1(A)
⊢ π.
as was required.
It is clear that the modal reasoning in the proof of Theorem 4.5 can be
extended beyond GLPω. For this, one needs a (hyper-)arithmetic interpretation
of GLPΛ. One such example is given in [8] but for λ > ω there are no canonical
formula complexity classes around. This problem can be solved by considering
a different interpretation of GLPΛ as presented in [15].
As a nice corollary to Theorem 4.5 we get the following simple but useful
lemma.
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Lemma 4.6. Let T be a Πm+1 axiomatized theory. For m ≤ n and A ∈ Wn,
we have, verifiably in T , that TAn ⊢ T
A
m.
The restriction on the complexity of T can actually be dropped as was shown
in [17, 1].
5 Ignatiev’s model and Turing-Taylor expansions
In this section we shall focus on sub-theories of Peano Arithmetic. We shall see
that if such a theory can be written as the finite union of generalized Turing
progressions, then it can be seen as “an element” of a well-known model for
modal logic.
5.1 Ignatiev’s universal model
The closed fragment GLP0ω of GLPω is a rich yet decidable structure. Ignatiev
exposed a Kripke model for GLP0ω that is universal in that the set of all formulas
valid in all worlds of the model is exactly the set of theorems of GLP0ω .
We refer to the standard literature ([11, 13, 6]) for details and limit ourselves
here to defining the model and state its main properties.
Ignatiev’s universal model U is a pair 〈Iω , {≻i}i∈ω〉 where Iω is a set of
worlds and for each i ∈ ω we have a binary relation ≻i on Iω. Worlds in
Ignatiev’s model for GLPω are sequences of ordinals,
〈α0, α1, α2, . . .〉 with αn+1 ≤ ℓ(αn)
where ℓ(α + ωβ) = β and ℓ(0) = 0. We define ~α ≻n ~β to hold exactly when
both αi = βi for all i < n and αn > βn. We have included a picture of a part
of U in Figure 1.
We recursively define ~α 1 ⊥, ~α  φ→ ψ iff (~α 1 φ or ~α  ψ), and ~α  [n]φ
iff for all ~β with α ≻n β we have ~β  φ, with the tacit understanding that the
other connectives are defined as usual in terms of ⊥,→ and the [n]’s. Ignatiev’s
model U is universal in that GLP0ω ⊢ φ ⇔ ∀ ~α∈Iω ~α  φ.
In the light of Proposition 3.6, we can represent each world ~α ∈ Iω by a
(non-unique) sequence of worms An ∈Wn:
〈A0, A1, A2, . . .〉 with An+1 ≤n+1 h(An) and on(An) = αn.
We often refer to these sequences ~A as Ignatiev sequences with their condition
on them that An+1 ≤n+1 h(An).
5.2 Turing-Taylor expansions
Since EA+ seems to be weakest theory for which we can properly formalize
Turing progressions we will define the Π0n+1 ordinal a theory U to be
|U |Π0n := sup{α | (EA
+)αn ⊆ U}.
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A main point of this paper is that collecting these ordinals per theory yields in
interesting structure: Ignatiev’s model U . Therefore, we define the spectrum of
a theory as expected.
Definition 5.1. For U a formal arithmetic theory that lies in between EA+ and
PA, we define its spectrum tt(U) by
tt(U) := 〈|U |Π01 , |U |Π02 , |U |Π03 , . . .〉.
Suggestively, we shall also speak of the Turing-Taylor expansion of U instead
of the spectrum of U . In case U ≡
⋃∞
n=0(EA
+)
|U|
Π0
n+1
n we say that U has a
convergent Turing-Taylor expansion.
We include the reference to Taylor in the name due to the analogy to Taylor
expansions of C∞ functions, that is, functions that are infinitely many times
differentiable (see acknowledgements). If f is a C∞ function, one can consider its
Taylor expansion around 0 as f(x) =
∑∞
n=0 anx
n. Thus, each Taylor expansion
is determined by by its sequence 〈a0, a1, a2, . . .〉 of coefficients. In the case of
a convergent Turing-Taylor expansion we fully determine the expansion by a
sequence of ordinals 〈ξ0, ξ1, ξ2, . . .〉 so that
U ≡
∞⋃
n=0
T ξnn .
We shall study which sequences of ordinals are attainable as coming from a
convergent Turing-Taylor expansion.
Note that we have defined tt(U) as to include only Π0n sentences but this
can easily be generalized to suitable sentences of higher complexities. For our
current purpose, studying sub-theories of PA, the restriction is not essential.
For Taylor expansions there is actually a uniform way of computing the
coefficients as f(x) =
∑∞
n=0
f(n)(0)
n! x
n where f (n) denotes the n-th derivative of
f and f (0) := f . For theories axiomatized by worms there we saw in Theorem
4.5 that there is also such a uniform way of computing the coefficients.
Note that the analogy to Taylor expansions is by no means perfect. In
particular, in Taylor expansions we see that all the monomials xn are mutually
independent, whereas in Turing progressions there will be certain dependency as
we already saw in Lemma 4.6. Therefore, we will rather speak of the spectrum
or ordinal spectrum of a theory instead of its Turing-Taylor expansion.
With every sequence ~α = 〈α0, α1, . . .〉 of ordinals below ε0 we can naturally
associate a sub theory (~α)tt of PA as follows
(~α)tt :=
∞⋃
n=0
EAαnn .
Of course we can and shall write the αn most of the times as worms An in Wn.
In general, we do not have that tt(( ~A)tt) = ~A. Let us first see this in a concrete
example and then prove some general theorems in the next sections.
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Example 5.2. For Π01 axiomatized theories T we have (in worm-notation) that
T 11 + T
01
0 ≡ T
1
1 + T
101
0 . In the classical notation system this reads T
1
1 + T
ω+1
0 ≡
T 11 + T
ω·2
0 .
Proof. By Theorem 4.5 we have that T 11 ≡ T + 〈1〉⊤ and T
01
0 ≡ T + 〈0〉〈1〉⊤.
Thus, T 11 + T
01
0 ≡ T + 〈1〉⊤ + 〈0〉〈1〉⊤. Clearly the latter is equivalent to
T + 〈1〉〈0〉〈1〉⊤ and we obtain our result by one more application of Theorem
4.5.
Using Proposition 3.6 one gets the correspondence to the more familiar or-
dinal notation system.
5.3 Each Turing-Taylor expansion corresponds to a unique
point in Ignatiev’s model
We shall now prove that for each theory U we have that tt(U) is a sequence that
occurs in Iω . Most of the work in doing so is included in the following theorem.
Theorem 5.3. Let T be some Πn+1 axiomatized theory and let A ∈Wn+1 and
B ∈Wn. We have, verifiably in T , that
TAn+1 + T
nB
n ≡n+1 T +A+ nB,
and
TAn+1 + T
nB
n ≡n T
AnB
n .
Proof. Since B ∈Wn, by Theorem 4.5 and Lemma 4.6 we know that
T nBn ≡ T + nB.
Consequently, we obtain the following equivalence.
TAn+1 + T
nB
n ≡ T
A
n+1 + nB (3)
Let us now see the following conservation result which proves the first part of
the theorem.
TAn+1 + T
nB
n ≡n+1 T +A+ nB (4)
By (3) it suffices to show that
TAn+1 + nB ⊢ π ⇔ T +A+ nB ⊢ π
for any π ∈ Π0n+2. However, if π ∈ Π
0
n+2 we also have that (nB → π) ∈ Π
0
n+2
since nB ∈ Π0n+1. Thus we can reason
TAn+1 + nB ⊢ π ⇔ T
A
n+1 ⊢ nB → π
⇔ T +A ⊢ nB → π by Theorem 4.2
⇔ T +A+ nB ⊢ π
⇔ T +AnB ⊢ π since A ∈Wn+1.
This proves (4) and also TAn+1 + T
nB
n ≡n+1 T + AnB. We readily obtain the
second claim of our theorem since by Theorem 4.2 we have T +AnB ≡n T
AnB
n .
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Corollary 5.4. If U is some sub-theory of PA with a convergent Turing-Taylor
expansion, so that U 6≡0 PA, then tt(U) defines a point in Iω.
Proof. Since U has a convergent Turing-Taylor expansion, |U |Π01 is well-defined.
Since it is well-known that (EA+)0ε0 ≡0 PA, by the assumption that U 6≡0 PA we
know that we can find a GLPω worm A with (EA
+)A0 ≡0 U whence |U |Π01 = A.
By Lemma 4.6 we see that each |U |Π0n < ε0. Thus, indeed, tt(U) defines a
sequence ~A of worms. W.l.o.g. we pick ~A so that An ∈Wn for each n.
Suppose now for a contradiction that for some n, the sequence ~A does
not satisfy the condition that An+1 ≤n+1 hn+1(An). As provably An ↔
hn+1(An)rn+1(An), clearly, An ≥n rn+1(An) whence T
An
n ⊢ T
rn+1(An)
n . By
Theorem 5.3 we know that T
An+1
n+1 + T
rn+1(An)
n ⊢ T
An+1rn+1(An)
n . But, since by
assumption An+1 >n+1 hn+1(An) we know that An+1rn+1(An) >n An. The
latter violates the assumption that |U |Π0n = An is the supremum of all B so
that (EA+)Bn ⊆ U .
5.4 Each point in Ignatiev’s model corresponds to a unique
Turing-Taylor expansion
Corollary 5.4 tells us that certain points in the Ignatiev model Iω can be seen
as mathematical theories with a convergent Turing-Taylor expansion. We now
wish to see that every point ~A in the Ignatiev model Iω can be interpreted
naturally as a theory.
The natural candidate would of course be the theory ( ~A)tt. But, we have
already seen in Example 5.2 that in general we do not have tt(( ~A)tt) = ~A.
However, as we shall see, for points in the Ignatiev model the equality does
hold.
We will need two technical lemmas to deal with the adjacent points in ~A.
The first, Lemma 5.5 deals with the case that these adjacent points violate the
condition An+1 ≤n+1 h(An) of Ignatiev sequences. The second case, Lemma
5.6 deals with the case when no such violation is there.
Lemma 5.5. Let T be a Πn+1 axiomatized theory. Moreover, let A ∈ Wn+1,
B ∈Wn and suppose A ≥n+1 hn+1(B). Then, verifiably in T , we have
TAn+1 + T
B
n ≡n T
Arn+1(B)
n .
Proof. We reason in T . Since clearly B ≥n rn+1(B) we have that T
B
n ⊢
T
rn+1(B)
n . Consequently,
TAn+1 + T
B
n ⊢ T
A
n+1 + T
rn+1B
n
≡n T
Arn+1(B)
n by Theorem 5.3.
Let π be some Π0n+1 sentence. We have thus seen that if T
Arn+1(B)
n ⊢ π, then
TAn+1 + T
B
n ⊢ π.
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For the other direction, suppose that TAn+1 + T
B
n ⊢ π for some π ∈ Π
0
n+1.
We wish to see that T
Arn+1(B)
n ⊢ π. We start with an application of Theorem
5.3 and see:
TAn+1 + T
rn+1(B)
n ≡n+1 T +A+ rn+1(B)
≡n+1 T +Arn+1(B) (∗)
≡n+1 T
A
n+1 + T
Arn+1(B)
n by Theorem 4.5.
As A ≥n+1 hn+1(B), we see that Arn+1(B) ≥n hn+1(B)rn+1(B), whence
Arn+1(B) ≥n B. Consequently, T
Arn+1(B)
n ⊢ TBn . Thus, if T
A
n+1 + T
B
n ⊢ π,
then also TAn+1 + T
Arn+1(B)
n ⊢ π and by (∗), we see T + Arn+1(B) ⊢ π. Since
π ∈ Π0n+1 we get by one more application of Theorem 4.5 that T
Arn+1(B)
n ⊢ π
as was required.
We note that the assumption A ≥n+1 hn+1B does not give us any in-
formation about the relations ≥n+m with m > 1 at different coordinates in
the Ignatiev sequence as these signs can switch arbitrarily. For example, let
A = 220222 and B = 2122. We have that
A >0 B
h1(A) <1 h1(B)
h2(A) >2 h2(B).
The next lemma takes care of the case A ≤n+1 hn+1(B).
Lemma 5.6. Let T be some Πn+1-axiomatized theory. Moreover, let A ∈Wn+1,
B ∈Wn and suppose A ≤n+1 hn+1(B). Then, verifiably in T , we have
TAn+1 + T
B
n ≡n T
B
n .
Proof. One direction is immediate so we reason in T and assume that TAn+1 +
TBn ⊢ π for some π ∈ Π
0
n+1; we set out to prove that T
B
n ⊢ π. However, by
assumption A ≤n+1 hn+1(B) so that
T
hn+1(B)
n+1 ⊢ T
A
n+1. (5)
Using this, we obtain
T +B ≡ T + hn+1(B) + rn+1(B)
≡n+1 T
hn+1(B)
n+1 + T
rn+1(B)
n by Theorem 5.3
≡n+1 T
hn+1(B)
n+1 + T
B
n by Theorem 5.3
⊢ TAn+1 + T
B
n by (5).
On the other hand, T + B ≡n T
B
n so that if T
A
n+1 + T
B
n ⊢ π, then T + B ⊢ π
whence also TBn ⊢ π quot erat demonstrandum.
Suppose that U ≡n V . As mentioned before, in general we do not have that
U + T ≡n V + T . However, we do have the following easy but useful lemma.
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Lemma 5.7. (In EA+) Suppose U ≡n V and T ⊆ Σn+1, then also U + T ≡n
V + T .
Proof. Immediate from the (formalized) deduction theorem.
Lemma 5.8. Let T be a Π1 axiomatized theory and let ~A ∈ Iω. We have,
verifiably in T , that
⋃n
i=0 T
Ai
i ≡m
⋃m
i=0 T
Ai
i for m ≤ n.
Proof. By induction using lemmata 5.6 and 5.7.
Lemma 5.9. Let ~A ∈ Iω. If
⋃n
i=0 T
Ai
i ⊢ T
B
n , then B ≤n An given that T is
consistent.
Proof. Suppose otherwise, that is An < B. Then by compactness, for a single
sentence π of complexity at most Πn we have that T
An
n + π ⊢ T
B
n . Since
B > An we certainly have T
An
n + π ⊢ 〈n〉TAnn ⊤ whence, by provable Σn+1
completeness also 〈n〉
T
An
n
π. Since the latter is equivalent to 〈n〉
T
An
n +pi
⊤ we get
by Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem for n-provability that TAnn + π is
inconsistent.
Theorem 5.10. Let ~A ∈ Iω. We have that tt(( ~A)tt) = ~A.
Proof. We need to see that |( ~A)tt|m = Am. This follows directly from the
previous lemmas.
5.5 Ignatiev’s model: A roadmap to conservation results
Now that we know that the Πn consequences of formal sub-theories between
EA+ and PA correspond to points in Ignatiev’s model, this gives us a nice
way of collecting all we know about the Π0n consequences of these fragments of
arithmetic into a picture: We write the corresponding theories T next to the
nodes in the model that correspond to the spectra tt(T ) of T . If we have two
theories T1 and T2, we can readily read off the amount of Πn+1 conservation
between them: look at the largest n such that
(
tt(T1)
)
n
=
(
tt(T2)
)
n
.
For example, it is known that IΣ1 ≡ 〈2〉EA+⊤ which would correspond to the
point 〈ωω, ω, 1〉. Similarly, PRA will correspond to 〈ωω, ω, 0〉 (see [4, Corollary
4.14]2). Parson’s Theorem is readily read off from the picture (see Figure 1)
since tt(PRA)1 = tt(IΣ1)1 = ω so that PRA ≡Π02 IΣ1.
However, the picture does not tell us which theories proves what kind of
consistency of which other theory. For example, although there is an arrow
between IΣ1 and PRA, it is clear that IΣ1 proves no consistency of PRA. In
[10] a model is presented where, apart from the conservation, one can directly
see and compare the consistency strength of the Turing progressions depicted
in that model. We defer the further filling out of the Ignatiev model to a later
paper.
2There is a minor detail in that this results is formulated over EA and we work over EA+.
Basic observations from [17] show that these differences are inessential for our limit ordinals.
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...
...
...
...
...
...
...
· · ·
0
1(= 〈1, 0〉)
2
〈ω, 0〉
ω + 1
ω + 2
〈ω + ω, 0〉
〈ω2, 0〉
ω
2 + 1
〈ω2 + ω, 0〉
ω
ω + 1
〈ωω+1, 0〉
ω
ω+1 + 1
〈ω, 1〉
〈ωω, 0〉
〈ω2, 2〉
〈ω2, 1〉
〈ω + ω, 1〉
〈ω2 + ω, 1〉
〈ωω, 1〉〈ωω, 2〉
· · ·
PRA ≡ 〈ωω , ω, 0〉
〈ωω+1, 1〉
〈ωω+1, 2〉〈ωω+1, ω, 0〉
〈ωω+1, ω + 1〉
〈ωω+1, ω, 1〉
IΣ1 ≡ 〈ω
ω
, ω, 1〉
Figure 1: Ignatiev’s model: the ≻0 relation is represented by a single arrow, ≻1
by a double and ≻2 by a triple arrow.
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